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Abstract 
Do our minds process fantasy, pretense, and reality differently? Participants read fantastical (Snow 
White eating an apple), pretend (a girl pretending to be Snow White), or realistic (a girl eating an apple) 
vignettes. Participants’ reaction to a property of each vignette’s realistic context (apple as ‘delicious’) or 
its unrealistic context (apple as ‘poisonous’) was measured by a computer program. Differences in study 
1 reaction time indicate that fantasy may require different mental representation than pretense and 
reality. Differences in study 2 fail to duplicate results from the fantasy condition in study 1, instead 
finding differences in mental representation after reading pretend vignettes. Trends in both study 1 and 
2 indicate possible influences of fantasy and pretense on realistic thought. 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The Cognitive Representation of Fantasy versus Pretense 
  Children start pretending as early as 18 months old, and their pretense develops throughout 
childhood. Lillard (2001) defines pretense as the elaboration and altering of one’s present reality, 
including the people, objects, and scenarios. Pretending is also identified as an activity that is highly 
based in cognition; both psychologists and philosophers have presented theories as to how the pretense 
cognitive process may work (see Carruthers, 2006; Leslie, 19879; Lillard, 2001; Nichols & Stich, 2000). 
However, scientific research has focused on behavioral pretense, as well as reasons for pretending, and 
has not specifically identified a cognitive pretense process.  
  Leslie (1987) proposes a well‐known and widely accepted theory of how pretense works in the 
mind. The basis for Leslie’s theory is the idea that when pretending, we must be careful to not alter our 
understanding of reality. First, Leslie explains that a person has an individualized “representation”(i.e., a 
definition of, or idea about) all entities in reality. For example, when a person sees a banana, their 
“representation” or idea of banana becomes activated in their minds. The representation may include 
the fact that a banana is a fruit, it can be peeled, and that it can be eaten. Therefore, if a person were to 
pretend that a banana is a telephone, they must not alter their original representation of banana by 
thinking it is always a phone. The understanding of a banana as a telephone must only exist in the 
moment of the pretense, and it must stay there when the pretending ends. Leslie (1987) calls this  
“representational abuse” – the concern that pretense may permanently influence our understanding, or 
representations, of reality.  
  Leslie (1987) presents the concepts of “decoupling”, “manipulating”, and most importantly, 
“quarantining” to suggest how representational abuse is avoided in cognition. To start, in order to think 
of a banana as if it were a telephone, one recognizes that the original representation of banana is not 
sufficient and must be altered. Thus, a person must “decouple” their original idea of banana, or make a 
copy of (“duplicate”), their representation of banana. Then, instead of changing the original 
representation of banana to include qualities of a telephone, the new “copied” or “decoupled” 
representation of banana can be altered instead. This step is called “manipulating” – the altering of the 
new, secondary representation to fit the pretend scenario. Finally, in order to then focus on the new 
pretend representation as a banana, and to not alter that original representation of banana to include 
the new representation, one must not think about the old representation of a banana as a fruit. To avoid 
this, Leslie suggests that we need to “quarantine”, or inhibit the original representation of a banana in 
our mind. One must not think about the banana as a fruit, or as something that can be peeled and 
eaten, so that idea is pushed to the back of the mind. Instead, a person can focus their mental efforts 
specifically on the idea that the banana is currently a communication device, a telephone.  
  Leslie (1987)’s concept of quarantining specifically suggests an important clue to how pretense 
might work in cognition. The idea of quarantining involves “inhibiting” an idea in our mind, and thus, 
most likely involves inhibitory control. Current research (Van Reet, McInnis, & Fast, 2012) is working to 
prove just this idea. Specifically, Van Reet et al.’s (2012) results show that children do in fact require 
inhibition of reality in order to consider pretend scenarios. However, results among adult participants 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are less clear. Although adults seemed to initially show a tendency towards inhibiting reality during 
pretense, the trend is mostly non‐existent.  
What about fantasy? 
  Fantasy specifically includes the idea of “magic”, which Nemeroff and Rozin (2000) loosely 
define as actions or beliefs that go against laws of nature, technology, or more generally, reality. 
Subbotsky, Hysted, and Jones (2010) stipulate that fantasy includes what is called “magical thinking” – 
an imaginary or “supernatural” world that includes alternatives or contradictions of reality. Examples of 
fantasy include witches, ghosts, or talking animals, along with more modern pop culture fantasy worlds 
such as Harry Potter or Twilight. 
While the aforementioned definitions of fantasy are vague, fantastical thinking also appears to 
require the inhibition of reality – an important similarity to pretense. When a person reads Harry Potter, 
for example, they must temporarily suppress ideas and thoughts about modern communication – cell 
phones, email, etc. – in order to accept the “wizarding world’s” use of methods such as owl mail 
delivery. As mentioned before, fantasy such as Harry Potter seems to almost require inhibition of the 
“natural laws” of reality – such as that humans can not fly, do magic, read minds, or become invisible 
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Subbotsky, Hysted, & Jones, 2010). Therefore, fantasy seems similar to 
pretense in its cognitive requirements. In fact, it appears as though it may be even more difficult, as it 
requires inhibition of more general, or simply a larger amount of aspects of reality.  
  After recognizing the similarity between pretense and fantasy, as well as understanding the 
differences, it is important for the purposes of this research to apply Leslie (1987)’s theory of cognitive 
pretense to an example of fantasy. A great example is a witch flying a broomstick. In order to think 
about this, a person must decouple their representation of “broomstick”, and manipulate the new 
copied or decoupled representation of broomstick, so that the broom is now a flying device. Then, the 
person must quarantine their idea of using a broom to sweep the floor in order to focus the mind on the 
idea that a witch uses a broom to fly. It is possible that the application of this theory to fantasy may go 
farther than quarantining the representation of broomstick. A person may also have to quarantine the 
laws of gravity, the fact that witches do not exist, or the general fact that people can not fly. Remember 
at this point that the concept of quarantining involves inhibition, and most likely then, inhibitory control. 
Thus, by using this example of a witch flying a broomstick, it is easy to see how a person might need 
similar inhibitory control processes to pretense in order to think about fantasy. 
  Based off of Leslie (1987)’s theory, and its possible applications to fantastical thinking, the 
following research attempts to answer two questions. First, what might be the cognitive demands of 
fantasy thinking – does it truly require inhibition and quarantining? And second, is fantasy cognition 
different (i.e., more difficult) than or similar to pretense cognition? 
In order to measure these differences, the current research used reaction time data. Reaction 
time is a reliable measure of how fast a person reacts to stimuli. In the case of the current research, 
reactions are measured in regards to how fast a participant reads a word out loud when they see the 
word appear on a computer screen. How fast the person says the word out loud can reliably tell a 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researcher whether that word is currently “active” (i.e., present) in the mind. Specifically, Balota & Lorch 
(1986) used the idea of priming – exposing a person to one idea (lion) that would activate a second 
related idea, or word, in their mind (tiger), and asking them to respond to a the second idea – to provide 
reliable reaction time data. Balota & Lorch (1986) found that participants who were presented with the 
word ‘tiger’ were successfully primed to respond to the word ‘stripes’ more quickly, indicating that the 
word was ‘active’ in their minds. However, the word ‘lion’, which primed for the word ‘tiger’, did not 
influence participants to react more quickly to the word ‘stripes’. Other research by Bunge, Dudukovic, 
Thomason, Vaidya and Gabrielli (2002) found that when asked to react to stimuli on a screen that were 
accompanied by distracting, inconsistent stimuli, participants displayed slower reaction times. The 
results from Bunge et al. (2002) suggest that when a person makes an effort to inhibit conflicting stimuli, 
response times to computer stimuli may be significantly delayed. Accordingly, Roelofs (2012) found that 
participants performing a basic “stroop task” who tried to read a color word (i.e., green) written in a 
conflicting color (i.e., red) had a significantly delayed response time to how quickly they could say the 
word. Based off of the aforementioned research, one could assume that a person who is quarantining or 
inhibiting an idea in their mind should be significantly slower to say that word than to say a word that is 
active or neutral, thus indicating inhibitory control. For example if a person is purposely making an effort 
not to think about a certain thing (i.e., eating a donut), they should be much slower to say that word 
(donut) than to say a word that they were currently thinking about (i.e., dog or leash), thus indicating 
inhibition of the idea of donut. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty‐four undergraduate participants were tested. Participants were between the ages of 18 
and 22 (M= 19.88). All participants were recruited through the Psychology Department’s volunteer 
participant website, SONA. All participants provided informed written consent, and were compensated 
with five dollars.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were instructed about the procedure verbally by the experimenter, as well as in 
written form on the computer screen. First, participants were asked to complete a test portion of the 
experiment by responding aloud to neutral words on the computer screen into the microphone. 
Participants were then exposed to a series of sentences on a computer screen. They were then asked to 
respond to a word out loud into a microphone (SV‐1 Voice Key). Verbal response times to the words 
were measured in milliseconds by the computer program SuperLab.  
The first five sentences that participants were exposed to were neutral test sentences to get the 
participants warmed up. The remainder of the sentences were created from a list of 25 fantastical 
characters (i.e., Harry Potter, Rapunzel, Snow White). For each fantastical character, three versions of a 
sentence were created. The three sentence types created were “fantasy”, “pretend”, and “realistic”. In 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accordance with each fantasy character’s group of sentences there were two word types – a word 
relevant to either the fantasy version of the sentence or the realistic version of the sentence. There was 
no word type specifically associated with the pretend sentence types, because the pretend sentences 
were similar to the fantasy sentences in all aspects, except that they included a real person pretending 
to reenact the fantasy character’s scenario.  
  An example of what participants experienced can be demonstrated with the example of 
Rapunzel as a fantasy character. For Rapunzel, a participant would see one of the following sentences: 
fantasy version – “Rapunzel lowers her very long hair out the window for the prince”; pretend version – 
“Katie pretends to lower her long hair out the window for a prince”; realistic version – “Katie braids her 
long hair before she goes to school in the morning.” It is important to note that each sentence has an 
equivalent focus point – on Rapunzel (or Katie)’s hair. Thus, each participant should be focused on the 
idea of the hair in each sentence – either as something that can be climbed, or as something to be 
groomed. After seeing one of these sentences, a participant would then either see a word associated 
with the realistic version of the sentence, such as “brush”, or with the fantastical version of the 
sentence, such as “rope”. 
Results 
  Study 1 results found, as predicted, that after reading the fantasy sentences participants were 
significantly faster to respond to the fantasy associates (M = 631.28) than to the real associates (M = 
657.81), t(32) = 2.85, p = .007. There were no differences found in how quickly people reacted to fantasy 
or realistic associate words after either pretend (real M = 652.77; fantasy M = 644.77), t(32) = 0.78, p = 
.4, or real sentences (real M = 635.24; fantasy M = 648.89), t(32) = 1.29, p = .2 (See Figure 1). The results 
are unexpected specifically in relation to the realistic sentences. After reading the realistic sentences, it 
was expected that participants would be quicker to say a real associate word than a fantasy associate 
word. Not only were the realistic condition results insignificant, but also they trended in the opposite 
direction than expected, as indicated by the means. 
  It is possible that participants were engaged in the fantasy scenarios enough that they simply 
began to associate all words, including those after the realistic sentences, with fantasy more so than 
they might normally. Due to these unexpected results, the purpose of Study 2 is to determine whether 
the fantasy and perhaps even pretend sentences were influencing participants in their responses for 
realistic sentences. Study 2 also aims to duplicate results from the fantasy condition of Study 1. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty‐seven undergraduate participants were tested. Participants were between the ages of 18 
and 22 (M = 20.19). All participants were recruited through the Psychology Department’s volunteer 
participant website, SONA. All participants provided informed written consent. A majority of the 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participants were compensated with five dollars; other participants received a small amount of class 
credit for their Introductory to Psychology classes.  
Procedure 
In order to replicate results from the fantasy condition, while distinguishing possible effects on 
the realistic condition, most of study 2 remained the same as study 1. Study 2 used the same sentences 
as study 1, with the addition of three new realistic condition sentences in order to get clearer results 
regarding the fantastical effects on reality. The main difference was the order in which the sentences 
were presented. Instead of allowing the sentences to be randomly chosen for type by the computer, 
study 2 controlled and ordered the sentences by type.   
All participants began by seeing a block of 6 realistic versions of the sentences (identified as 
“Real 1”). This gave a pretest measure of how quickly participants responded to fantastical associates 
after being exposed only to reality. After the first realistic block of sentences, participants were either 
exposed to a block of 8 pretend sentences, or a block of 8 fantasy sentences. If they were exposed to 
the pretend sentences first, they would be exposed to the fantasy sentences after they had completed 
all the pretend sentences. Finally, all participants were exposed to a final block of 6 realistic sentences 
(identified as “Real 2”). The “Real 2 “condition served as a measure of how participants reacted to 
fantastical associates after being first exposed to fantasy/pretense, and then reality. After every 
sentence in all conditions, participants would again respond to either the realistic or fantastical 
associate word aloud into the microphone. 
Participants were counterbalanced for order type and sentence type. Half the participants saw 
fantasy sentences first after “Real 1”, and half the participants saw pretend sentences after “Real 1”. 
Participants were never exposed to more than one version of a sentence for the same fantasy character. 
Thus, if they saw a realistic version of a sentence related to Snow White in the “Real 1” section, they 
would not be later exposed to a fantasy version of the Snow White sentence. In order to control for this, 
four versions of the experiment were created, each including a different group of sentences in each 
block of sentence types (i.e., Real 1, Fantasy, Pretend, and Real 2).   
Results 
  Study 2 did not duplicate results from study 1. After exposure to fantasy sentences, participants 
were not significantly different in their response times to fantasy (M = 674.70) versus realistic (M = 
677.38) associate words, t(34) = 0.29, p = .77. However, study 2 did find a significant difference within 
the pretend condition. After reading the pretend versions of the sentences, participants were 
significantly faster to the fantastical (M = 666.76) associate word than to the realistic (M = 685.78) 
associate word, t(34) = 2.02, p = .05. In regards to the realistic blocks of sentences, there was no 
significant difference, t(34) = 0.59, p= .55, in reaction time to fantasy (M = 675.119) versus realistic (M = 
679.92) associate words during the first control block of realistic sentences (Real 1). During the second 
realistic group of sentences (Real 2), after exposure to fantasy and pretense, there was also no 
significant difference, t(34) = 1.04, p = .31, in response time to fantasy versus realistic associate words. 
However, this second realistic condition did trend in the predicted direction, as seen in study 1, with the 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realistic associate words at a slower average time (M = 676.55) than the fantastical associate words 
average time (M = 660.19) (See Figure 2).  
  There were no significant order effects. Accordingly, there was no difference, t(34)= 0.38, p = 
.71, between the average reaction time to realistic words during the first block of real sentences versus 
the second block of realistic sentences. There was also no difference, t(34)= 0.85, p = .4, in the response 
times to fantastical words between the first and last blocks of realistic sentences. However, this also 
trended in the expected direction, with the average response time to fantastical associates faster after 
the second realistic block (M = 660.19) than after the first (M = 675.11).  
Discussion 
The results of the current research are unclear. There appears to be some sort of inhibitory 
control demands among both fantastical and pretend thought, as indicated by a significant effect of 
fantasy during study 1, and a significant effect of pretense during study 2. Due to the fact that the 
pretend sentences included a highly fantastical aspect, it is not entirely surprising that an effect was 
found in study 2. However, because the results are not replicated in the two studies, the effect appears 
unstable. When the effect of fantastical or pretend sentences on response time to fantastical versus 
realistic associate words is significantly different, it is assumed that inhibitory control is the mechanism 
responsible. The instability of the results indicates, however, that the need for inhibitory control is 
probably not as strong as originally thought.  
There could be multiple explanations for these unstable results. For one, the participants in this 
study were exposed to the fantasy scenarios for only a few seconds, and were only involved in one 
sentence of each fantasy scenario. Perhaps it takes deeper involvement in fantasy scenarios, such as 
reading a paragraph or even a book, to require more intense inhibition or quarantining of reality. Thus, 
these sentences may have been brief enough that the participants were not truly submerged in a 
quarantined fantasy.  
Second, these results appear consistent with Van Reet et al.’s (2012) research on pretense 
cognition. As mentioned in the introduction, adults in Van Reet et al.’s research are not consistent in 
showing a significant effect of quarantining, or inhibition, of reality after pretend scenarios. The 
sentences in Van Reet et al.’s research are similarly short, and participants are thus not involved deeply 
in the pretense scenarios before response time is measure. These results therefore support the current 
research.  
It is interesting to note the differences between the pretend scenarios used in Van Reet et al.’s 
(2012) research, and the pretend scenarios used in the current research. Van Reet et al.’s scenarios 
involve very basic pretend scenarios, such as the example mentioned before of using a banana as a 
telephone. In comparison, the current research used scenarios in which a real person pretended to do 
something fantastical (i.e., flying on a broomstick), or pretended to be a fantastical character (i.e., 
Rapunzel). The scenarios used in the current research seem to require more difficult pretense, perhaps 
eliciting the significant results seen in the pretend condition of study 2. Again, the results are not easily 
replicated, but it is possible that future research may find differences between the cognitive demands of 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different types of pretense, perhaps depending on their degree of difficulty or involvement of the 
participants.   
Finally, it is possible that adults simply have such advanced cognition that both pretense and 
fantasy are not difficult tasks for them, requiring little to no inhibitory control or quarantining. Since 
results in both this research and Van Reet et al.'s (2012) found highly varying results regarding effects of 
fantasy and pretense in adult cognition, perhaps a different age group should be considered in future 
research. Young children may exhibit the inhibitory or ‘quarantining’ effects implied by Leslie (1987) and 
hypothesized by the current research. Subbotsky, Hysted, and Jones (2010) found that children who 
watched movie clips that contained magical aspects (i.e., Harry Potter) performed much higher on three 
measures of creativity. This influence of fantasy on children’s creativity could mean that there are 
important and beneficial cognitive processes happening during children’s fantastical thoughts, such as 
inhibitory control. Further, Van Reet et al.’s (2012) aforementioned research on pretending has found 
significant differences in how children ages four and five respond to reality after exposure to pretend 
scenarios, indicating in that the quarantining processes may be at work during children’s basic pretense. 
Finally, the fact that children have a much higher tendency to believe in such fantastical creatures, like 
the tooth fairy or witches (Woolley, Boerger, & Markman, 2004), could make such research interesting 
and different than with adults who do not believe in such entities.  
  Although it was not significant, there also appears to be an influence of fantastical and/or 
pretend thinking on realistic thinking. Participants seemed slightly more inclined to associate fantastical 
words with reality situations after being exposed to fantasy or pretense beforehand. Perhaps support 
for this trend is noted by the aforementioned results of Subbotsky, Hysted, and Jones (2010), who found 
an influence of fantastical thinking on other creative tasks in children. Again, this implicates the need for 
future research to study children’s fantastical thinking processes. Adults may simply be too advanced at 
these types of cognition to show the influences of fantasy on other thought processes, resulting in our 
insignificant trends in both study 1 and 2. Additionally, children have a natural tendency to separate 
pretend “worlds” or scenarios that are not obviously the same (Weisberg & Bloom, 2009). Perhaps this 
would effect how children process reality after exposure to fantasy situations, as they may be more 
inclined to put more effort into separating the two worlds.  
  In conclusion, despite the fact that this research is unclear it is a good starting point for fantasy 
cognition. Because little to no research has been done on the cognitive representations of both fantasy 
and pretense, there are multiple directions for future research to continue on the basis of this research. 
Not only do these results suggest interesting comparison points between fantasy, pretense, and reality, 
they also may add to previous research (Van Reet et al., 2012) on age differences among these types of 
cognition. 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Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Means of reaction times from study one, reported in milliseconds, by sentence and word type. 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Means of reaction times from study two, reported in milliseconds, by sentence and word type. 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